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Introduction
In the wake of the financial crisis, policymakers have 
been talking about shifting from defined benefit plans 
to defined contribution plans in the public sector.  
Three states – Georgia, Michigan, and Utah – have 
taken action, joining the 10 states that had introduced 
some form of defined contribution plans before 2008.  
Interestingly, these new plans are “hybrids” that com-
bine elements of both defined benefit plans and de-
fined contribution plans.  Such an approach spreads 
the risks associated with the provision of retirement 
income between the employer and the employee.  
This brief provides an update on defined contribution 
initiatives in the public sector and then discusses 
whether the hybrids that have been introduced are the 
best way to combine the two plan types. 
The brief proceeds as follows.  The first section 
discusses the issues involved with moving from a 
defined benefit plan to a defined contribution  
arrangement.  The second section recaps the role that 
defined contribution plans played in the public sector 
before the financial crisis.  The third section describes 
the new hybrid plans recently adopted in Georgia, 
Michigan, and Utah.  And the fourth section sug-
gests that a better type of hybrid might be one where 
defined contribution plans are “stacked” on the state’s 
defined benefit plan rather than placed alongside of it.   
The fifth section concludes that defined contribution 
plans have a role in the public sector, but that role is 
supplementing, not replacing, defined benefit plans.
Defined Benefit vs. Defined  
Contribution  
A defined benefit plan provides employees with 
lifetime retirement income based on a formula that 
accounts for service and final average salary.  Most 
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defined benefit plans in the public sector adjust ben-
efits, at least partially, for inflation after retirement.  
Both employees and employers generally contribute 
to public sector plans.  Defined benefit plan assets are 
held in trust and managed by professional investors.  
In contrast, defined contribution plans are like 
savings accounts.  The employee and employer both 
contribute money to the account, and the employee 
selects the investments from a list of options provided 
by the plan.  The benefit at retirement depends on the 
value in the account and how employees elect to take 
receipt of the money – lump sum, periodic payments, 
or an annuity.  
Evaluating whether to shift from a defined benefit 
to a defined contribution plan involves consideration 
of risks, costs, and human resource goals.
Risks
The defining characteristic of defined contribution 
plans is that they shift all the responsibilities and all 
the risk from the employer to the employee.  In terms 
of responsibilities, the employee must decide whether 
to join the plan, how much to contribute, how to 
allocate those contributions among different invest-
ment options, how to change those allocations over 
time, and how to withdraw the accumulated funds at 
retirement.  Under a defined benefit plan, the sponsor 
retains these responsibilities.  The plan requires par-
ticipation, sets contribution rates, invests the assets, 
and pays an annuity at retirement.  
Leaving the responsibilities in the hands of em-
ployees means that they are exposed to the risks of 
saving too little, losing funds when financial markets 
fluctuate, seeing the value of their retirement income 
eroded by inflation, and outliving their resources 
since payment is generally not in the form of an  
annuity.   
In a defined benefit plan, the sponsor bears the 
investment risk during the accumulation phase and 
then absorbs longevity risk and much of inflation risk 
after retirement.  This arrangement means that if 
financial markets collapse, the sponsor – in the public 
sector, taxpayers – must come up with additional 
funds to cover promised benefits.1  Public plan spon-
sors also face the “moral hazard” that benefit prom-
ises will not be funded.  Participants, who believe that 
they will be paid regardless of funding, may not push 
for government contributions.  And politicians are all 
too happy to address short-term priorities rather than 
put money aside for long-term funding needs.  Simi-
larly, legislatures sometimes make unfunded benefit  
improvements in good times that further aggravate 
the funding shortfall.  As a result, future taxpayers 
and employees will be required to contribute not only 
to cover the accruing cost of benefits for current work-
ers but also to cover benefits for retirees for whom 
insufficient funds have been put aside.  A defined 
contribution plan avoids this type of “moral hazard,” 
as the plans are fully funded by design.  
Costs
For any given level of benefits, defined contribu-
tion plans, which maintain individual accounts and 
typically update these accounts daily, have higher 
administrative expenses than defined benefit plans.  
In addition, most defined contribution plans use 
mutual funds or similar instruments as investment 
options – with an average expense ratio payable to the 
fund manager of about 0.60 percent for bond funds 
and about 0.67 percent for stock funds.2  In contrast, 
defined benefit plans involve professionally-managed 
large investment pools with no individual account 
reporting.  As a result, the annual cost of a defined 
contribution plan generally exceeds that of a defined 
benefit plan (see Figure 1).     
Figure 1. Administrative and Investment  
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Human Resource Issues
Defined benefit plans are designed to attract and 
retain qualified employees.  As such, these plans 
become more valuable the closer the employee gets 
to the full retirement age, because accrual rates often 
increase with age, and the salary base is usually an 
average of the last three to five years of earnings.  
Vested employees who leave early forfeit significant 
retirement income because their accumulated credits 
are applied to their salary at termination rather than 
their salary at retirement.3     
With a few exceptions, defined contribution plans 
were not initially created as retirement vehicles but 
rather as supplementary savings accounts.4  Since the 
value of these plans increases more evenly over an 
employee’s worklife, they provide no incentive to stay 
on the job.  Similarly, they do not penalize employees 
who leave early.  Mobile employees can take the funds 
in their account with them when they leave employ-
ment and roll them over into a new defined contribu-
tion plan or individual account.  
Other Arguments and Counterarguments
Risk, cost, and human resource considerations are 
the real issues relevant to deciding whether to shift 
from a defined benefit to a defined contribution plan.  
But other assertions also arise in the debate.  Some 
supporters highlight the magnitude of the unfunded 
liabilities in public sector defined benefit plans as 
justification for switching to a defined contribution 
plan.  The reality is that even with a new defined con-
tribution plan, states and localities are still left to deal 
with past underfunding.  A new plan only addresses 
pension costs going forward; it does not help close the 
current gap between pension assets and liabilities.5  
Similarly, some contend that switching to a 
defined contribution plan would save money in the 
future.6  But, as noted above, for any given level of 
benefits, defined contribution plans cost more.
Advocates may think that even if total costs 
increased, taxpayers could gain by shifting contribu-
tions from the government to the employee.  Trans-
ferring the burden to the employee provided a major 
economic incentive in the private sector to move 
from defined benefit plans (where employees make 
no contributions) to 401(k) plans (where employees 
make the bulk of the contributions).  But, in the pub-
lic sector, many employees already make substantial 
contributions to their defined benefit pensions.  In 
states where employees are covered by Social Security, 
the median contribution rate is 5 percent of earn-
ings.  In states without Social Security, the median 
employee contribution rate is 9 percent (see Figure 2).   
Therefore, state and local governments might meet 
significant resistance from public employees if they 
attempted to shift more of the cost to participants.  Of 
course, moving to a defined contribution plan could 
be used as a mechanism to cut retirement benefits 
and thereby lower total employee compensation.  
Figure 2. State and Local Employer and  
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The main issue appears to be one of risk.  From 
the perspective of sponsoring governments, shifting 
to a defined contribution plan would eliminate invest-
ment, inflation, and longevity risk from these entities 
and, thereby, taxpayers.  These plans would be funded 
by definition and, when things go wrong in financial 
markets, the taxpayer would not be responsible for 
covering the shortfall.  The other side of alleviating 
risks for taxpayers is that public employees must face 
the risk of saving too little, the risk of poor investment 
returns, the risk that inflation will erode the value 
of their income, and the risk that they might outlive 
their assets.7
Pre-2008 Defined Contribution 
Activity
The fact that defined contribution plans put employ-
ees at such risk may help explain why before the 
financial crisis only a smattering of states had  
introduced these plans on a mandatory basis.8  Im-portantly, only two states – Michigan and Alaska – 
required all new hires to participate solely in a defined 
contribution plan (see Figure 3).9  The mandate 
applied only to new hires, because most states are 
constrained by their constitution or case law from 
reducing benefits for current employees.  Two states 
– Oregon and Indiana – adopted “hybrid” plans, 
where employees are required to participate in both 
a defined benefit and a defined contribution plan.  
Another six states retained their defined benefit plan 
and simply offered the defined contribution plan as 
an option to their employees.10  
Figure 3. Defined Contribution Plans, by State, 
2011
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The time line of the introduction of these defined 
contribution plans is interesting (see Figure 4).  Some 
of the changes may have been a response to econom-
ics or politics, but much of the activity occurred in the 
wake of the fantastic performance of the stock market 
during the 1990s.12
Since the plans are relatively new, the compulsory 
plans apply only to new hires, and the others are 
optional, the number of participants and amount of 
assets in defined contribution plans are modest (see 
Figure 4. Introduction of State Defined  
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Note: For specific definitions of the classifications used in 
this figure, see footnote 11.  
Sources: Various retirement systems’ annual reports and 
websites of state legislatures. 
Appendix).13  To date, participants account for less 
than 5 percent of all state and local workers, and as-
sets amount to less than 1 percent of total state and 
local pension assets.14  (“Fact Sheets” on each of the 
mandatory defined contribution plans discussed in 
this brief are available on our website.)
Post-Crisis Developments
In the wake of the financial crisis, three states (Michi-
gan, Georgia, and Utah) have introduced mandatory 
“hybrid” plans for new employees.  Interestingly, 
none of the three has followed the Alaska-Michigan 
(SERS) model of relying solely on a defined contribu-
tion plan.  Rather, each has adopted a plan where new 
employees accumulate retirement income under both 
a defined benefit and a defined contribution plan.  An 
additional nine states are discussing defined contribu-
tion options.15
Georgia
General state employees covered under Georgia’s Em-
ployee Retirement System (ERS) hired after January 1, 
2009 are covered under the new hybrid plan; existing 
ERS members had the option to join the new plan.  Issue in Brief 5
New hires are automatically enrolled in the 401(k) 
plan (unless they affirmatively elect not to participate) 
and contribute 1 percent of salary with additional 
contributions up to 5 percent eligible for an employer 
match.16  The match is 100 percent of the automatic 
contribution and 50 percent of optional contributions, 
for a maximum match of 3 percent of salary.  Employ-
ees can contribute up to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) limit, but will receive no further employer 
match.  
The defined benefit plan will pay 1 percent for 
each year of service on the annual average of the high-
est 24 months of earnings.17  Members contribute 
1.25 percent of salary to the defined benefit plan, and 
the state contributes an actuarially-determined rate, 
which was 6.54 percent of 
payroll in 2009.  
System communiqués 
indicate that the change 
was driven primarily by 
the preference of young 
workers, who constitute 62 percent of the state’s 
workforce, for wages over benefits.  In response, the 
State raised wages and introduced the smaller hybrid 
plan, with a 401(k) component so that young mobile 
workers would have something to take with them 
when they left state employment.   
Michigan
As discussed above, since 1997 all new Michigan gen-
eral state employees have been enrolled in a 401(k) 
plan.  But when the time came to revamp the system 
for public school employees, the State decided to 
adopt a hybrid.  Employees hired after July 1, 2010 au-
tomatically contribute 2 percent of salary to the 401(k) 
(unless they affirmatively elect not to participate), 
with optional contributions up to the IRS limit.  The 
sponsor matches 50 percent of the employee’s first 2 
percent of contributions.18
The defined benefit plan for new hires will pay 1.5 
percent for each year of service on the annual average 
of the highest 60 months of earnings.  Employees will 
contribute 6.4 percent of salary to the plan.  Whereas 
the accrual rate is the same as it was under the two 
existing defined benefit plans for school employees, 
the age and service requirements for this plan have 
been increased and the cost-of-living adjustment 
eliminated. 
Press reports suggest that future employer costs 
(including required contributions for retiree health 
insurance) were a major motivation for the new 
plan.19  Essentially, the new plan reduces the benefits 
compared to the existing defined benefit plan, and the 
defined contribution plan involves an extremely mod-
est contribution from the employer.
Utah
State and local government employees hired after July 
1, 2011 will have the option to participate in either a 
defined contribution plan or in a hybrid.  In the case 
of the defined contribution plan, the employer will 
automatically contribute 10 percent for most public 
employees and 12 percent for public safety and fire-
fighter members.20  Employees can contribute up to 
the IRS limit.  Employee contributions vest imme-
diately, and employer 
contributions vest after 
four years.  Members 
can direct the invest-
ment of their contribu-
tions immediately, and 
those of the employer after four years.   
Under the hybrid plan, the employer will pay up to 
10 percent of an employee’s compensation toward the 
defined benefit component; employees will contribute 
any additional amount to make the required contribu-
tion.  The defined benefit plan for new employees is 
less generous than the former plan: the accrual rate 
is reduced from 2.0 percent per year to 1.5 percent; 
the period for calculating final average salary was 
increased from high three years to high five; and the 
employee contribution increased from zero to the cost 
above 10 percent.  For the defined contribution com-
ponent of the hybrid plan, employers will contribute 
10 percentage points minus the amount contributed 
to the defined benefit plan.  For example, if they 
contribute 10 percent to the defined benefit plan, they 
will contribute nothing to the defined contribution 
plan.  
Table 1 on the next page summarizes the provi-
sions of the new hybrid plans.  The pattern is quite 
similar in several respects.  First, the combined cost 
of the new plan is significantly less than the pre-
existing defined benefit plan.  Second, the commit-
ment to the defined contribution plan is minimal.  
Experience with 401(k)s in the private sector suggests 
that participants tend to stay where they are put.21  
So if automatic contributions are set at 1 percent or 
2 percent of earnings, participants are likely to keep 
their contributions at that level.  Low saving in the de-
fined contribution component means that employees 
will be forced to rely primarily on the now-reduced 
defined benefit plan in retirement. 
Today’s hybrid plan model  
could be redesigned to work better.Center for Retirement Research 6
Table 1. Provisions of New Hybrid Plans
Provision  
                               Defined benefit plan
Accrual rate 1.0% 1.5% 1.5%
COLA Ad-hoc None CPI up to 2.5% 
Contributions
    Employer 6.54% (2009) TBD 10% cap
    Employee 1.25% 6.4%  DB cost > 10%
                              Defined contribution plan
Automatic  
    contribution
1% 2% 10% – DB cost
Employer  
    match
100% on first 1%, 
50% on next 4%




Note: Michigan Public Schools’ 2010 Actuarial Valuation Report has 
not yet been released.
Sources: Various retirement systems’ annual reports, legislation, 
and websites of state legislatures.
A Better Mousetrap?
The emergence of hybrid plans reflects an attempt 
to balance employee and taxpayer risk.  But, to date, 
states are achieving this goal by reducing the govern-
ment’s contribution across the board rather than 
considering how best to use each plan type.  
Defined benefit plans provide the most secure 
income for long-service employees.  While some pub-
lic sector employees leave in the first 10 years, many 
tend to remain for a full career.22  Therefore, defined 
benefit plans are an effective mechanism for public 
sector employers to attract and retain employees.  De-
fined benefit plans, however, put the taxpayer at risk if 
financial markets drop, inflation takes off, or retirees 
live longer than expected.  
A fair question is how much risk should taxpay-
ers bear?  Utah answered that question by capping 
employer contributions at 10 percent of payroll.  Such 
a cap, however, places lower paid and higher paid 
participants at equal risk of having to increase contri-
butions.  A better approach to limiting taxpayer risk is 
to cap the income covered by the defined benefit plan.  
Such a cap would prevent the situation where the typi-
cal taxpayer, earning $50,000, is forced to pay higher 
taxes when the stock market plummets to cover 
benefits for highly-paid public employees, such as 
university presidents.  Therefore, the proposal would 
be to limit coverage under the defined benefit plan to 
earnings below, say, $50,000 (indexed for inflation).23  
Many public sector workers would still be covered in 
full under the defined benefit plan.
Earnings above $50,000 would be covered by a 
defined contribution plan.  Thus, someone earning 
$100,000 would receive benefits based on the first 
$50,000 from the defined benefit plan and benefits 
on the second $50,000 from the defined contribu-
tion plan.  That is, instead of “parallel” plans where 
employees contribute to both a 401(k) and a de-
fined benefit plan from the first dollar of earnings, 
“stacked” plans would maintain the defined benefit 
plan as a base and provide defined contribution cover-
age for earnings above some cutoff (see Figure 5).  The 
stacked approach is a suggestion for a “better plan 
design” and could be wed with any desired size of the 
plan.













Source: Authors’ illustration. 
The advantage of the “stacked” approach is that 
it allows employees with modest earnings to receive 
the full protection of a defined benefit plan.  This 
group would be the most vulnerable if required to 
rely on a 401(k) for a portion of their core retirement 
benefit.  Indeed, the private sector experience with 
401(k)s illustrates the concern.  The typical private 
sector taxpayer approaching retirement (ages 55-64) 
had accumulated only $78,000 in 401(k) assets before 
the financial crisis.24  So maintaining a full defined 
benefit plan for public employees such as elementary 
school teachers would be preferable.  More highly-
paid public employees would still have the protection 
of a defined benefit plan as a base and would then rely 
on the 401(k) for earnings replacement that exceeded Issue in Brief 7
the earnings of a typical private sector worker.25  This 
overall arrangement offers a reasonable balance by 
providing adequate and secure benefits targeted to 
public employees who need them most while limit-
ing the risk to taxpayers of covering large pension 
shortfalls.
One question is whether such a stacked approach 
would violate IRS non-discrimination rules.  The legal 
answer is that tax-qualified governmental plans are 
generally not subject to non-discrimination provi-
sions.26  On a substantive level, the government 
contribution for the defined contribution plan could 
be less than for the defined benefit plan, so that the 
two plans taken as a whole do not favor higher-paid 
workers.  
Conclusion
Defined contribution plans may well have a role in 
the public sector, but in combination with, not as an 
alternative to, defined benefit plans.  The hybrids in-
troduced in Georgia, Michigan, and Utah reflect spon-
sors’ recognition of the need to balance the risks to 
employees and the risks to taxpayers.  These hybrids 
consist of slimmed-down defined benefit plans and 
defined contribution plans operating in “parallel.”  A 
preferable approach may be a “stacked” arrangement.  
Meaningful defined benefit plans could remain as a 
secure base for the typical public employee, and de-
fined contribution plans could be “stacked” on top to 
provide additional retirement income for those at the 
higher end of the pay scale.  Such an approach would 
ensure a more equitable sharing of risks and would 
also prevent headlines generated by the occasional 
inflated public pension benefit.    
 Endnotes
1  Although, in theory, taxpayers bear the risk, in the 
wake of the recent financial collapse employers and 
employees have shared the burden.  From 2008 to 
2011, 20 states increased pension contributions for 
either new or existing employees, while five states 
reduced benefits for current employees and an ad-
ditional three eliminated or reduced the cost-of-living 
adjustment for current retirees.  In several instances 
– Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota are widely-
publicized examples – the state’s actions have been 
taken to court.  See National Conference of State 
Legislatures (2008-2011) for more details.
2  The estimates of investment management expenses 
are from Lipper (2008).
3  Under many state plans, vesting does not occur for 
10 years, and employees who leave receive only their 
contributions and some minimal amount of credited 
interest.
  
4  TIAA-CREF is a notable exception.
5  In many cases, closing an existing defined benefit 
plan to new hires and switching to a defined contri-
bution plan increases short-term costs.  The Govern-
mental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) State-
ment Number 25 states that closed plans using the 
level percent of payroll method for calculating the an-
nual required contribution (ARC) must acknowledge 
that covered payroll is decreasing.  This recognition 
frontloads costs.  As a result, most closed plans use 
the level dollar method of amortizing the unfunded 
liability.  However, the ARC under the closed plan is 
still frontloaded relative to the ARC under the ongo-
ing plan.  Moreover, market gains from future new 
hire contributions that would have been used to offset 
the unfunded liability are now sequestered in the 
new defined contribution plan.  See California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (2005); Michigan 
House Fiscal Agency (2009); Retirement Systems of 
Minnesota (2011); and The Segal Company (2010) for 
more information. 
6  For a more detailed discussion of the cost efficien-
cies of defined benefit pension plans, see Almeida 
and Fornia (2008).
7  The defined contribution aspects described – indi-
vidual investment direction, high expense compared 
to defined benefit plans, flexibility over payout, and 
lack of annuitization – reflect how most defined 
contribution plans are currently designed.  A defined 
contribution plan could be designed to address many 
of the current downsides.  For example, MyFRS in 
Florida is a low-fee defined contribution fund, while 
the Texas Municipal Retirement System is a cash bal-
ance plan that annuitizes the balances of individual 
member accounts. 
8  Public sector workers often have optional 403(b) 
and/or 457 defined contribution plans that allow 
them to put aside a portion of their pay on a tax-
deferred basis to augment their public pension.  
These supplementary plans are not the topic of this 
brief.  Rather, the focus is on states where the nature 
of the primary plan has changed.  For a discussion of 
early defined contribution activity, see Munnell et al. 
(2008).  
9  In Nebraska, the primary Public Employee Retire-
ment System was a defined contribution plan from 
1967 to 2002.  It was closed to new employees and 
replaced with a cash balance plan on January 1, 2003 
over concerns that the defined contribution plan was 
producing lower returns than the defined benefit 
plans (see Nebraska Public Employees’ Retirement 
Systems, 2002, for more details).  A cash balance plan 
is a defined benefit plan that maintains notional indi-
vidual accounts throughout the asset accrual phase.  
Similarly, the West Virginia Teachers plan, which 
became a primary defined contribution plan in 1991, 
switched back to a primary defined benefit plan in 
2005.  The Texas Municipal Retirement System main-
tains a cash balance plan.  The District of Columbia 
requires its general government employees to join a 
primary defined contribution plan, but our analysis is 
limited to states.   
10  These states were Colorado, Florida, Montana, 
Ohio, South Carolina, and Washington.  Except in 
Washington and Ohio, the options are either a tradi-
tional defined benefit plan or a defined contribution 
plan.  Washington offers a choice of a defined benefit 
plan or a hybrid plan.  Ohio employees can choose 
from a defined benefit plan, a defined contribution 
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plan, or a hybrid plan.  In all cases, the defined ben-
efit plan is the default for those who do not actively 
make a selection.    
11  Mandatory defined benefit plans are primary plans 
that require employees to join.  Mandatory defined 
contribution plans are primary plans that require 
employees to join.  Mandatory hybrid plans require 
employees to join a plan with both a defined benefit 
and a defined contribution component.  “Choice” 
plans typically allow employees to pick either a pri-
mary defined contribution plan or a primary defined 
benefit plan.   
12  For example, from January 1, 1995 to December 
31, 1999, the S&P 500 had an average annual return 
of nearly 30 percent.  For a discussion of early defined 
contribution activity, see Munnell et al. (2008).  This 
study looked at the effect of economic and political 
factors on the probability of introducing a defined 
contribution plan for public employees.  It found that 
Republican leadership – with its emphasis on indi-
vidual control over investments and plan portability 
– was the leading predictor of plan changes.  
13  In the private sector, when a new plan is adopted, 
the existing defined benefit plan is generally frozen.  
Existing employees can retain the benefits earned but 
are not permitted to accrue any further service credits.   
In the public sector, when a new plan is adopted, 
existing employees generally have a legal right to 
continue to participate in the previous plan and only 
employees hired after the date the plan is adopted are 
required to participate in the new plan. 
14  Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bu-
reau (2008) and Public Plans Database (2009).
15  The issue is under discussion in Alabama, 
Connecticut, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Wisconsin.  Legislation to introduce a defined 
contribution plan for new hires recently passed the 
Kentucky Senate, but has not yet been acted on by 
the House of Representatives.  Similar proposals are 
currently under consideration in Illinois and Okla-
homa, while a defined contribution bill was defeated 
in North Dakota.  See Frazier (2010); Fehr (2010); Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures (2011); Steyer 
(2010); and Preston and McNichol (2010).
16  In the public sector, the only 401(k)s are grandfa-
thered plans that were established 5/6/86 or before, 
so Georgia had originally established a 401(k) plan 
before 1986 as an optional supplement to its primary 
defined benefit plan.  See PlanMember Financial 
Corporation (2010). 
17  The Board of Trustees can increase the benefit fac-
tor in the future up to 2 percent if funds are available.  
18  Michigan House Fiscal Agency (2010).
19  Governor of Michigan (2010) and Michigan  
Association of School Boards (2010). 
20  Liljenquist (2010).
21  Madrian and Shea (2001); Choi et al. (2004); and 
Gale, Iwry, and Orszag (2005).
22  Authors’ estimates from the Actuarial Valuations 
of the 14 largest plans.
23  The Internal Revenue Code contains a maximum 
compensation limit for defined contribution plans.  
This limit is $245,000 in 2011.  It is indexed for infla-
tion and increased in $5,000 increments.  A similar 
procedure could be used for stacked plans.  
24  This figure, which comes from the Federal Re-
serve’s 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, also in-
cludes IRA assets as they typically come from 401(k)
rollovers during a job switch.
25  A well-designed defined contribution plan would 
set the combined employee-employer contribution 
at a level to achieve, in combination with a defined 
benefit plan, a targeted replacement rate.  It would 
also have the default payment at retirement be an 
annuity, with the ability of participants to opt out if 
such an arrangement did not meet their needs.  One 
reviewer also suggested that the plan might guarantee 
the employee’s contribution regardless of investment 
performance to encourage participation. 
26  Most of the public sector defined contribution 
plans are 401(a) money purchase plans with man-
datory employee contributions.  As noted earlier, 
governments generally cannot have 401(k) plans, and 
since 457(b) plans are subject to contribution limits, 
sponsors may be reluctant to crowd out supplemen-
tal saving.  See Powell (2011) for a more thorough 
discussion of the nondiscrimination tax rules for 
governmental plans.Center for Retirement Research 10
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 APPENDIXAppendix – Primary Defined Contribution Plans
Characteristics of Primary Defined Contribution Plans, 2009
Plan name Legislative date
Participants Assets ($ in millions)
2007 2009 2007 2009
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Mandatory defined contribution plans
Alaska PERS 2005 2,862 7,516 9 41
Alaska TRS 2005 646 1,997 6 27
Michigan SERS 1996 24,043 26,044 2,547 2,207
Mandatory hybrid plans
Georgia – GSEPS 2008 0 2,105 0 311
Indiana PERF – ASA 1997 213,984 223,561 2,707 2,669
Indiana TRF – ASA 1997 122,107 164,590 4,605 3,901
Michigan – MPSERS 2010 0 11,617 0 0
Oregon PERS – IAP 2003 43,541 59,073 1,877 2,109
Utah – Tier II Contributory 
Hybrid
2010 0 0 0 0
Choice of primary plan
Colorado PERA – PERA-
Choice
2004 489 3,039 3 37
Florida RS – PEORP 2000 98,070 121,522 3,687 4,075
Montana PERS – DCRP 1999 1,913 2,345 41 44
Ohio PERS – Combined 
Plan
2002 6,905 7,354 157 223
Ohio PERS – Member 
Directed Plan
2002 8,579 9,824 124 201
Ohio STRS – Member 
Directed and Combined 
Plans
2001 11,863 12,829 283 297
South Carolina – ORP 2000 26,873 31,968 502 561
Utah – Tier II Defined 
Contribution
2010 0 0 0 0
Washington PERS –  3 1999 27,605 31,123 1,348 1,188
Washington SERS – 3 1998 37,854 38,585 1,052 918
Washington TRS – 3 1998 57,667 60,146 3,971 3,419
Total   685,001 815,238 22,916 22,230
Note: Michigan SERS 2009 assets reflect 2008 levels.  MPSERS has not yet reported 2009 asset levels.  Ohio STRS does not 
separate assets for the Member Directed and Combined Plans in its financial reports.    
Source: Public Plans Database (2007 and 2009). About the Center
The Center for Retirement Research at Boston Col-
lege was established in 1998 through a grant from the 
Social Security Administration.  The Center’s mission 
is to produce first-class research and forge a strong 
link between the academic community and decision-
makers in the public and private sectors around an 
issue of critical importance to the nation’s future.  
To achieve this mission, the Center sponsors a wide 
variety of research projects, transmits new findings to 
a broad audience, trains new scholars, and broadens 
access to valuable data sources.  Since its inception, 
the Center has established a reputation as an authori-
tative source of information on all major aspects of 
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